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Abstract: This present paper relates the results of an exploratory survey distributed among 
individuals invested in so-called ethical (or socially responsible) mutual funds, and attempts 
to develop a better understanding of these individuals’ ethical beliefs – especially concerning 
whether, or why, they think that the practices of contemporary ethical funds indeed are 
ethical. Survey questions were informed by the contemporary philosophical literature 
pertaining to the ethics of investing and designed to elicit the respondents’ basic intuitions 
about the ethics of different investment strategies. Our results indicate that respondents show 
considerable support for both a moral purity perspective and a moral effectiveness 
perspective, and they seem to find it difficult to choose between these perspectives. Indeed, 
we find that this is not just a conflict between different groups of investors with different 
moral outlooks, but many individuals themselves seem to be struggling with conflicting 
ethical intuitions. We argue that these results are incompatible with the idea that ethical 
investors refrain from thinking systematically about ethics simply in order to be able to get 
away with also investing in non-ethical funds. A more probable explanation is developed 





Ethical investment, also known as socially responsible investment (SRI), can be defined as the 
practice of integrating (putatively) ethical, social and/or environmental considerations into a 
financial investment process – for instance, a mutual fund’s process of deciding what stocks 
or bonds to buy or sell, or how to relate further to the companies invested in. This practice has 
become increasingly popular in the investment community during the last couple of decades; 
both among individual and institutional investors, and perhaps especially among retail mutual 
funds (investment trusts / unit trusts / trust funds) marketed directly towards the general 
public. According to recent estimates there are now over 170 mutual funds with an explicit 
ethical, social or environmental profile in the US, jointly worth around $171.7 billion (Social 
Investment Forum 2007), and the corresponding figures for the UK are roughly £9 billion 
spread out over nearly 100 funds (Eurosif 2008).  
  A growing body of academic literature can now be found attempting to profile 
the people investing in these ethical mutual funds – typically referred to simply as ethical 
investors. We believe that this research topic is important, not only for developing a better 
understanding of these ethical investors as such but also for the purpose of evaluating the 
practices of the ethical funds. A fair number of studies have concerned the general 
demographic, socio-economic and psychographic characteristics of ethical investors, and 
indicate that they tend to be better educated, less affluent, more often female, and with a 
greater awareness of social and environmental issues than investors in general – or so-called 
non-ethical investors (Beal and Goyen 1998, Getzner and Grabner-Kräuter 2004, Lewis and 
Mackenzie 2000a, McLachlan and Gardner 2004, Nilsson 2008, Rosen et al. 1991, Tippet and    
Leung 2001). Furthermore, a range of studies have concerned the interplay between ethical 
investors’ ethical (or social/environmental) and financial motivations. The results of these 
studies are more mixed: whereas most ethical investors seem driven by both kinds of 
motivations, it remains unclear exactly to what extent they are ready to sacrifice financial 
returns for ethical pay-off – some say rather little, others say a lot (Beal et al. 2005, Lewis and 
Mackenzie 2000a, Lewis and Webley 1994, Mackenzie and Lewis 1999, Nilsson 2009, 
Webley et al. 2001). 
  Curiously, however, we still know very little about ethical investors’ ethical 
beliefs (or attitudes) as such, and especially whether they agree that so-called ethical 
investment as it is practiced today indeed is ethical. A couple of studies have examined ethical 
investors’ views on business ethics in general, or what kinds of corporate activities or 
business areas they hold to be ethical versus unethical (Anand and Cowton 1993, Rosen et al. 
1991). While these studies may give some indication as to whether ethical funds are focusing 
on the right kind of companies, however, they say very little about how ethical funds should 
relate to these. Of course, the fact that ethical investors invest in ethical funds could in itself 
be taken as an indication of an acceptance of the investment strategies of these funds. But 
appearances may be deceiving and, furthermore, quite similar behaviour can obviously be 
motivated by very dissimilar beliefs and attitudes. 
  Really the only studies which have examined ethical investors’ ethical beliefs 
more carefully are two studies by Lewis and Mackenzie (Lewis and Mackenzie 2000b, 
Mackenzie and Lewis 1999). In a first set of exploratory telephone interviews with just 10 
ethical investors, questions were asked about the underlying “philosophy” or “principles” 
which led them to invest in ethical funds. The subjects are reported to have mentioned quite a 
variety of moral motives – from deontological, consequentialist and eudaimonic motives to 
ones arising from “the prick of conscience” and from “an ethic of self-help” – but 
overshadowing these ethical beliefs, it is reported, was “a fog of confusion” (Mackenzie and 
Lewis 1999). A survey was subsequently constructed with more distinct questions, 
specifically concerning whether ethical investors would support more active and engaged 
forms of ethical investment practice. The results indicate that most of the respondents actually 
were quite happy with more passive forms of ethical investment and that only a small 
minority supported more progressive investment strategies (Lewis and Mackenzie 2000b). 
  The research presented in the present paper could be said to complement the 
work of Lewis and Mackenzie, but it also aims to go deeper into the moral psyche of so-called 
ethical investors. The paper relates the results of an exploratory survey answered by 369 
individuals invested in the ethical funds offered by one of the larger banks in Sweden. In 
order to be able to scrutinise the ethical beliefs of these individuals as carefully as possible, 
our questions were informed by the contemporary philosophical literature pertaining to the 
ethics of investing, and designed specifically to elicit some of the respondents’ more basic 
intuitions about ethics in investing. Our central research query is whether ethical investors 
think that the investment strategies used by ethical funds indeed are ethical and, more 
generally, whether they agree with the ethical justification for, or ethical principles behind, 
these strategies typically defended by proponents of the ethical investment movement. By 
addressing this query, we not only hope to enhance our current understanding of the ethical 
beliefs of the ethical investor but also to situate the literature on ethical investors in a wider 
discussion of both philosophy and (moral) psychology. 
  The paper proceeds as follows: In section 1, we present some background on the 
investment strategies of ethical funds and how these typically are justified by proponents of 
the ethical investment movement, as well as the philosophical debate concerning these 
justifications. Section 2 gives some further details of the empirical method used to gather data 
on the views of ethical investors. In section 3, our descriptive results are presented as well as a    
preliminary analysis of our respondents’ ethical beliefs, and it is suggested that our 
respondents show considerable support for both a moral purity perspective and a moral 
effectiveness perspective – and they furthermore seem to find it difficult to choose between 
these perspectives. Section 4 then relates the results of a more sophisticated statistical analysis 
of our material, where we find that the result just mentioned is not just a conflict between 
different groups of investors with different moral outlooks but many individuals themselves 
seem to be struggling with conflicting ethical intuitions. Finally, section 5 contains a 
discussion of possible explanations of these results: We argue that our results are 
incompatible with the idea that ethical investors refrain from thinking systematically about 
ethics simply in order to be able to get away with also investing in non-ethical funds. A more 
probable explanation is therefore developed building on the contemporary psychological 
literature concerning intuitions in ethics. 
 
 
1. Background: How ethical funds invest and why 
 
The investment strategies of ethical funds 
 
Ethical mutual funds typically employ one or more of a certain range of, supposedly ethical or 
socially responsible, investment strategies – indeed, the employment of one or more of these 
strategies is generally what is taken to separate ethical from non-ethical funds (Cowton and 
Sandberg 2011). The investment strategy most commonly employed by ethical funds is what 
could be called the avoidance strategy, or ‘negative screening’ (Domini and Kinder 1986, 
Miller 1991, Sparkes and Cowton 2004). Funds that employ this kind of strategy attempt to 
avoid investing in companies engaged in business areas or practices which are deemed to be 
ethically unacceptable or problematic in some sense – that is, they incorporate negative 
ethical criteria in their decisions on what companies’ shares to acquire, hold or dispose of. 
The negative criteria can relate to the kinds of products or services that a firm provides, the 
way it conducts its business, or the location of its activities.  
  Under an avoidance strategy, negative ‘screening’ is primarily applied when 
stocks are being considered for purchase or when an existing portfolio is first being checked 
against ethical criteria. But subsequent regular monitoring is typically also undertaken in 
order to check that the companies which have been invested in have not changed – through 
altered practices, development of their activities or acquisition of another business – in such a 
way that they come to contravene the criteria (Mackenzie 1997). It may be noted that funds 
seldom are absolutist about their criteria: For instance, they typically allow companies whose 
engagement in an unacceptable area constitutes less than a certain percentage (often 5-15%) 
of their operating income (Schepers and Sethi 2003, Schwartz 2003, Sparkes 2002), and also 
companies who are only indirectly engaged in such areas (though they themselves may hold 
considerable investments in, or be subcontractors to, seriously unacceptable companies) 
(Michelson et al. 2004). Nevertheless, the avoidance strategy could be said to represent an 
attempt to cleanse an investment portfolio of companies with undesirable features, and is 
probably the strategy most commonly associated with ethical investment among the general 
public.  
  A second investment strategy typically employed by ethical funds is what could 
be called the supportive strategy, or ‘positive screening’ (Cowton 1999, Domini and Kinder 
1986, Mackenzie 1997). Funds who employ this kind of strategy attempt to seek out and 
invest in companies engaged in business areas or practices which are ethically praiseworthy or 
exemplary in some sense – that is, they incorporate positive ethical criteria in their decisions 
on what companies’ shares to acquire, hold or dispose of (the latter if a company is no longer    
regarded so positively, or an alternative investment is regarded more positively in social 
terms). Again, such positive criteria might relate to the kinds of products or services that a 
firm provides, the way it conducts its business, or the location of its activities. 
  Even if an explicit avoidance strategy is not in place, it is possible for one to be 
pursued by default when conducting a supportive strategy - if corporations that possess good 
attributes also tend not to have negative ones. Very often, though, a supportive strategy will 
be operated deliberately in tandem with an avoidance strategy (Brill et al. 1999, Domini 2001, 
Domini and Kinder 1986). According to recent estimates over 77% of the assets of the 
American ethical investment industry, and over 65% of the European counterpart, are 
invested following some kind of ‘social screens’ – i.e., with either positive or negative 
criteria, or indeed some kind of combination of them, in place (Eurosif 2008, Social 
Investment Forum 2007). Some funds combine positive and negative screening by permitting 
rather straightforward trade-offs between the different criteria, i.e., by calculating an overall 
score or rating for a company (Gray et al. 1996, Schepers and Sethi 2003). Others first use 
negative criteria to determine a set of ethically problematic companies or industries, and then 
positive criteria to determine the companies or industries in this set with the relatively best 
social characteristics (the ‘best in class’ approach) (O’Rourke 2003, Schepers and Sethi 2003, 
Sparkes 2002). 
  A third and somewhat different strategy typically employed by ethical funds is 
commonly called shareholder activism (Brill et al. 1999, Domini and Kinder 1986, Sparkes 
2002). This kind of strategy is different from the two previous ones in that funds which 
employ it attempt to invest in companies that are engaged in business areas which are deemed 
to be morally unacceptable and then use their shareholder influence to make them change 
their ways. That is, these funds try to change the ‘bad’ into the ‘good’ in some sense (Domini 
and Kinder 1986). The starting point for activist strategies is the contention that investors, as 
shareholders in (or in some sense owners of) companies limited by shares, enjoy certain rights 
and privileges in relation to those companies. Most commonly, funds use their right to 
introduce and vote on resolutions at companies’ annual general meetings in order to try to 
make the companies in question take a stronger responsibility for the societal effects of their 
actions. However, also other kinds of campaigns are commonly associated with shareholder 
activism – for example, starting a dialogue with corporate managers, writing letters to institu-
tional investors, and sending out press releases (Domini 2001, Lang 1996, Sandberg 2008). 
  It is in the US that shareholder activism – at least as a visible, public activity –
has been most widespread historically, with high profile examples such as Campaign GM in 
the 1970s (Vogel 1978). But there have also been notable cases elsewhere, such as the 
movement in the UK against bank loans to South Africa during the apartheid era (Sparkes 
1995), and, indeed, Europe now seems to be leading in shareholder activism activity – at least 
in terms of the amount of resources dedicated to it. According to recent estimates almost half 
of the assets of the European ethical investment industry are held by investors engaged in 
shareholder activism, compared to only 27% in the US (Eurosif 2008, Social Investment 
Forum 2007). Exactly what explains this recent surge in European interest in activism remains 
unclear, but one suggestion could be that European institutional investors simply have 
incorporated social and environmental considerations into their traditional active ownership 
practices – that is, their interaction with all kinds of companies (both ‘good’ and ‘bad’) on 
corporate governance issues (Louche and Lydenberg 2006). 
  The three strategies above really constitute the bulk of what contemporary 
ethical funds do. But we might also mention a fourth and final strategy sometimes employed 
by ethical funds. Some European ethical funds give financial support, typically as a fixed 
percentage of their annual return, directly to charitable organisations like Oxfam, the Red 
Cross, etc. (O’Rourke 2003, Skillius 2002). An American counterpart to this is sometimes    
referred to as community investing: Funds that engage in this kind of investing attempt to 
support minority communities or communities with poor economic development by, for in-
stance, lending money directly to local banks or credit unions which collaborate in job-
creation programs and housing projects (Brill et al. 1999, Domini 2001, Kinder et al. 1993). 
Since a common feature of both of these initiative types is that the respective ethical funds 
engage in them mainly for the sake of charity, and therefore also accept a lower level of return 
on their investments, we may refer to these alternatives as philanthropic investment strategies 
in what follows. 
  Obviously, the four kinds of strategies outlined above are highly stylized and 
could be spelled out in more detail in a variety of ways. Quite often, combinations of and/or 
trade-offs between strategies are used, and also trade-offs with strictly financial criteria. But 




The philosophy of ethical investment 
 
The received view among a great number of both commentators and proponents of the ethical 
investment movement is that there essentially are two underlying motivations for, or 
justifications of, ethical investment as such: one is ‘consistency’ and the other ‘social change’ 
(Cowton 1998, Domini and Kinder 1986, Domini 2001, Mackenzie 1997, Schueth 2003). The 
appeal to consistency is sometimes spelled out as the rather simple idea that how one invests 
cannot be divorced from how one acts in other areas of one’s life or, more specifically, that it 
seems inconsistent to invest in companies or business areas which one otherwise morally 
disapproves of (Sandberg 2007). The appeal to social change, on the other hand, is typically 
spelled out as the idea that ethical investment should ‘make a difference’, i.e., that investors 
have ethical reasons to invest a way which makes the world a better place – by, e.g., making 
unethical companies cease with their unethical practices, or making ethical companies 
become even better at serving the needs of their stakeholders. In the literature from 
proponents of the ethical investment movement, these ideas are seldom elaborated on further, 
yet are generally thought to be compatible with each other and to jointly motivate why one 
should invest in an “ethical” manner (in ethical funds) rather than investing “non-ethically” 
(in other funds). 
  The contemporary philosophical literature pertaining to the ethics of investing 
can be taken to have improved upon these suggestions. It may be noted that a good deal of 
academic commentators have criticised the appeal to consistency; for instance for its general 
opaqueness, its moral implausibility, or for having little to do with ethics in the first place 
(Anderson 1996, Monahan 2002, Sandberg 2007, Sparkes 2001). In their recent overview 
article, however, Cowton and Sandberg (2011) suggest that the appeal to consistency could 
become both more plausible and interesting from a philosophical point of view if it is 
understood along the lines of how some philosophers (like, e.g., Bernard Williams) indeed 
have understood appeals to consistency or integrity – namely as a deontological constraint on 
actions. They say: “Many people think that selling weapons to countries at war is morally 
wrong, and they may then also think that it is morally wrong to invest in companies doing so. 
On this understanding, the argument from integrity says that it is always wrong (at least prima 
facie) to invest in companies which themselves are engaged in wrongdoing. The wrongdoings 
committed by certain companies, then, may morally ‘taint’ those that become investors in 
those companies.” (Cowton and Sandberg 2011, p. 8). 
  On Cowton and Sandberg’s account, the appeal to consistency – or, as they 
sometimes call it, the moral purity perspective – is primarily an argument for the avoidance    
strategy, i.e., an argument for why it is ethical to avoid investing in, for instance, weapons and 
tobacco companies. Indeed it is an argument for a very absolutist sort of avoidance strategy, 
where one never invests in these companies, neither directly nor indirectly (cf. Kolers 2001). 
Cowton and Sandberg (2011) further write that there are three ways of spelling out the moral 
purity perspective more precisely – or three ways of understanding exactly how investors 
become morally ‘tainted’ by their relation to unethical companies: (1) Some argue that what 
makes investors morally tainted is the fact that they profit from the wrongdoings of these 
companies – that is, that they in some sense benefit from other people’s suffering (cf. Domini 
and Kinder 1986, Irvine 1987, Mills 1996). (2) Another idea is that investors are at fault 
because they support the wrongdoings of certain companies in the sense of giving them more 
resources to do their dirty deeds, or by at least facilitating their activities (cf. De George 1999, 
Irvine 1987, Mackenzie 1997). (3) According to a third idea, what morally taints investors is 
not that they financially support or benefit from these companies, but that they morally 
support them – that is, that investing in companies engaged in wrongdoing indicates a 
symbolic support for such activities and therefore is morally wrong (cf. Larmer 1997). For our 
present purposes, we may add a fourth and perhaps less philosophically stringent alternative: 
(4) Some proponents of the ethical investment movement simply seem to argue that it is 
wrong to have “any kind of relation whatsoever” to unethical companies (cf. Mackenzie 
1997). 
  Sandberg (2008) argues that proponents of a moral purity perspective indeed 
need to supplement their account with one of the ideas above, because the moral purity 
perspective is supposed to work as a principled – as opposed to pragmatic – argument for the 
avoidance strategy. That is, the moral purity perspective is supposed to show why investing in 
unethical companies is wrong in itself, and not just wrong because investing in some other 
way would have better consequences. However, Sandberg argues that, when scrutinised more 
carefully, at least two of the ideas above – (2) and (3) – have rather close affinities to a 
consequentialist moral framework. Saying that it is wrong to support the wrongdoings of 
companies in the sense of giving them more resources to do their dirty deeds is obviously an 
idea that talks about consequences directly, although perhaps only a certain kind of 
consequences (direct harm) (ibid., pp. 97-100). Furthermore, what is ethically problematic 
with showing symbolic support for unethical activities is perhaps simply the fact that this 
symbolic message will have negative effects on the behaviour of others (ibid., pp. 120-126). 
  The alternative to the moral purity perspective, then, according to these 
philosophers, is a consequentialist perspective emphasising social change, or what could be 
called the moral effectiveness perspective. According to Cowton and Sandberg (2011), “some 
commentators, preferring moral effectiveness to moral purity, are concerned more about the 
consequences of actions than about their conformance to principle” (p. 7). Although this 
perspective sometimes is used to justify the avoidance strategy as well (cf. Hudson 2005, 
Rivoli 2003), commentators keen on moral effectiveness more often tend to argue that ethical 
funds should focus on the other strategies outlined above: the supportive strategy, shareholder 
activism and/or philanthropy. On the moral effectiveness perspective, namely, the idea is that 
investors ought to invest in the way which most effectively brings about social change, or has 
the highest probability of making the world a better place. And simply shunning a certain 
company’s shares on the stock market, it is argued, will seldom have any real impact on either 
the price of the shares or the underlying company’s activities since stock markets typically are 
highly liquid – and non-ethical investors also have financial incentives to counteract price-
attacks from ethical investors (Haigh and Hazelton 2004, Hudson 2005, Mackenzie 1997, 
Sandberg 2008). However, by directly supporting small-scale yet exemplary business 
ventures, or engaging more actively with unethical companies, or distributing some of one’s    
investment returns directly to people in need, even individual investors could perhaps help 
make the world a better place. 
  Much more can probably be said about both the moral purity and the moral 
effectiveness perspectives, but our purpose here has simply been to introduce the broader 
outlines of the contemporary philosophical discussion pertaining to the ethics of investing. To 
sum up, this discussion tends to focus on the conflict between the perspectives of moral purity 
and moral effectiveness, and the former is typically taken to support the avoidance strategy 
whereas the latter more often is taken to support either the supportive strategy, shareholder 
activism or philanthropy. We now turn to the question of where the people actually investing 





In order to be able to scrutinise the ethical beliefs of ethical investors as carefully as possible, 
we constructed a number of items informed by some of the most central distinctions in the 
philosophical literature introduced above. As can be seen in Table 1 and Table 2, two 
somewhat different types of items were constructed. First, six "regular" questions were 
formulated which rather straightforwardly invite respondents to give their opinions on various 
matters relevant to the moral purity and moral effectiveness perspectives. However, in order 
to be able to dig even deeper into the moral psyche of respondents, we also formulated two 
“moral dilemmas” which in different ways make them choose between either backing 
effectiveness or backing purity. The general aim of all eight of these items was to elicit 
respondents’ basic ethical opinions related to the moral effectiveness/purity distinction. As 
very little (if any) research has been performed on this topic to date, it may be noted that items 
were designed to elicit indications of the respondents' ethical beliefs rather than confirming 
any previously hypothesised nature of these beliefs.  
  The questions were included in a mail-based questionnaire which also contained 
questions on slightly different matters. The opening instruction of this particular section of the 
questionnaire told respondents to focus on how they themselves think that ethical funds should 
be and behave; that is, what they think that a perfect or ideal ethical fund would do. Before 
sending out the questionnaire, a small number of experts within different fields were 














  The questionnaire was then distributed to a random sample of 2000 individuals 
that had invested in at least one of the ethical funds offered by one of the larger banks in 
Sweden. We believe that Sweden is an appropriate country for researching beliefs and 
attitudes concerning ethical investment as it is generally thought to be one of the more    
developed markets for this kind of investment. According to recent estimates the Swedish 
ethical investment market now amounts to roughly €191 billion, making it – despite being a 
small country – the fifth largest ethical investment market in Europe (Eurosif 2008). 
Furthermore, our choice of focusing on investors affiliated with one of the country’s larger 
banks was intentional. Although the bank in question offers a wide range of ethical 
investment vehicles, it also offers all kinds of non-ethical investment vehicles and is in no 
way known only for its ethical investment opportunities. Thus, we are fairly confident that we 
have been able to reach a relatively wide cross-section of individuals of all ages and 
persuasions. 
  Of the 2000 questionnaires sent out, a total of 402 (20.1%) were returned. After 
deleting the cases that had more than 50% missing data (as recommended by Hair et al. 2006), 
we judged that a total of 369 questionnaires were usable, and this results in an effective 
response rate of 18.5%. Although this is somewhat lower than in other surveys of ethical 
investors, the actual number of respondents is sufficient for our exploratory purpose. The 
answers were subsequently entered into the statistical software program SPSS. The remainder 
of the paper presents and discusses the results of these statistical analyses. 
 
 




Judging from the responses to the first three of our questions, it seems safe to say that there 
was considerable support for the moral purity perspective among our respondents. First of all, 
when we asked them whether they think that ethical funds ought to avoid investing in 
companies that they (the respondents) find morally problematic, only 6% of respondents 
answered that ethical funds should not practice avoidance. This is exactly in line with Lewis 
and Mackenzie’s (2000b) result that 93.5% of their subjects stated that they wanted to avoid 
“companies which are doing harm”.
1 Furthermore, when asked to what extent ethical funds 
ought to avoid investing in companies perceived as ethically questionable, a majority of our 
respondents (56.5%) answered that ethical funds never should invest in any of these 
companies. 
  As noted above, most contemporary ethical funds allow into their portfolios 
companies whose engagement in an unacceptable business area constitutes less than a certain 
percentage (often 5-15%) of their operating income. We thus gave the respondents the full 
range of options shown in Table 3. Interestingly, only 15.5% of respondents seemed to think 
that the use of cut-off points can be ethically justified, and thus we find that an overwhelming 
majority of ethical investors agree with the criticisms directed against the use of cut-off points 
from a range of academic commentators (Mackenzie and Lewis 1999, Michelson et al. 2004, 
Schepers and Sethi 2003, Schwartz 2003). The idea that it may vary from case to case to what 
extent ethical funds should avoid investing in unethical companies was actually slightly more 
                                                 
1 Unlike Lewis and Mackenzie, however, we didn’t want to suggest any more specific criteria of unethical 
business behaviour here and so we let our respondents choose from a brief list of alternatives to say for 
themselves what kinds of companies they think that ethical funds should avoid investing in. “Companies using 
child labour” came out on top (87.7%), followed by “companies which pollute the environment” (85.8%) and 
“companies dealing with tobacco, alcohol or weapons” (74.1%). However, little attention should be paid to these 
more specific answers since our list of alternatives was very brief indeed.    
popular than the idea of cut-off points but, as already noted, a majority of respondents 









  In order to further investigate the support for moral purity, we presented 
respondents with a slightly more complicated scenario. They were asked to assume that 
‘company X’ is involved in some kind of business practice that they themselves find unethical 
and that ‘company Y’ is a company holding shares in company X. Now “which of the 
following statements do you agree with the most?”, we asked, and presented them with the 
options displayed in Table 4. As can be seen in that table, as many as 71.9% of respondents 
seemingly thought that the contemporary practice among ethical funds of allowing companies 
that are only indirectly engaged in unethical business areas is ethically problematic. If you are 
morally tainted by investing in company X, that is, you are also morally tainted by investing 
in company Y which holds shares in company X (cf. Kolers 2001). While some respondents 
(21.4%) seemed to think that the question was too difficult to answer, basically everyone who 








  Judging from their answers to this first subset of questions, then, respondents 
seem to be thinking along the lines of a fairly hardline moral purity perspective – indeed, they 
seem much more hardline than the managers of contemporary ethical funds. However, when 
we asked them to clarify exactly why they think that ethical funds should avoid investing in 
the companies that they think are unethical, things start to become more complicated. As 
possible reasons, we presented respondents with the four explications of the moral purity 
perspective that we found in the literature (see above), plus a more open consequentialist 
reason, inspired by the moral effectiveness perspective and basically saying that the avoidance 
strategy can have a positive impact on companies. Respondents were instructed to mark as 
many reasons as they would like. As seen in Table 5, the support for both deontological (A, B, 
C or E) and consequentialist (D) reasons indicate that many of the respondents generally 
justify their support for the avoidance strategy by appealing to a mix of both deontological 
and consequentialist thinking. Furthermore, it may be noted that the reason inspired directly 
by the moral effectiveness perspective (D), together with the two purity reasons (B and C) 
which, according to Sandberg (2008), most easily lend themselves to semi-consequentialist 
interpretations, actually come out on top!  
 
---------------------------------------------- 
                                                 
2 Perhaps this result corresponds with Lewis and Mackenzie’s (2000b) finding that 87% of their respondents 
stated that they want their “investments to be ethically clean”. But we are not sure whether all respondents would 
know exactly what this means, and so we hope that our questions are more straightforward.    
 







Turning now to a couple of questions dealing more directly with the moral effectiveness 
perspective, we indeed seem to have found considerable support for this perspective as well 
among our respondents. When asked whether they think that ethical funds should try to make 
the world a better place, for instance by influencing companies to take a stronger 
responsibility for society as a whole, as many as 90.2% of our respondents said yes. Just to 
get a sense of the strength of the respondents’ commitment to moral effectiveness, we 
combined this question with presenting respondents with alternative ideas of how to weigh 
moral effectiveness against financial return. As seen in Table 6, a clear majority (65.0%) 
thought that the aim of influencing companies is sufficiently important to warrant at least 
some sacrifice of financial returns, although few respondents were ready to accept 








  We next asked respondents to grade, on a 5 point scale, exactly how effective 
they thought that the different investment strategies currently employed by ethical funds are in 
terms of influencing companies into becoming more socially responsible. Table 7 shows the 
different strategies asked about, together with the average effectiveness grade given by 
respondents (where 5 was the highest and 1 the lowest). Quite in line with how most academic 
proponents of the moral effectiveness perspective reason, respondents seem to hold the 
supportive strategy as the most promising one (3.89), followed by the fairly confrontational 
activist strategy of exposing unethical companies in the media (3.61). (This is somewhat 
different from Lewis and Mackenzie’s (2000b) results, where respondents showed 
considerable support for the supportive strategy but strongly disapproved of confrontational 
forms of shareholder activism.) Interestingly, however, the avoidance strategy gets a very 
high average effectiveness grade from our respondents (3.47) – certainly much higher than 
academic proponents of the moral effectiveness perspective would give it. As noted above, 
most academic proponents of this perspective argue that simply shunning a certain company’s 
shares on the stock market seldom will have any real impact on either the price of the shares 
or the underlying company’s activities. Our respondents seem to disagree with this, however, 
and perhaps this is because they’re thinking of the kind of symbolic effects which we have 




Please insert Table 7 about here 
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  The investment strategies which respondents believe in the least are 
philanthropy and shareholder activism in a more traditional sense – either voting at the annual 
general meetings of unethical companies or, more generally, being an active owner in both 
ethical and unethical companies. Indeed, these strategies received an average effectiveness 
grade of less than 3 (the middle grade), indicating that respondents not only hold them as 
relatively but also as absolutely ineffective. This view of the ineffectiveness of traditional 
shareholder activism is shared by at least one academic commentator (Sandberg 2008). To 
summarise, then, our respondents’ view of the effectiveness of the different investment 
strategies employed by contemporary ethical funds are roughly in line with the views of 
academic proponents of the moral effectiveness perspective, save for their somewhat 
unorthodox stand concerning the avoidance strategy. 
 
 
Purity or effectiveness? 
 
But what ultimately matters the most; moral purity or moral effectiveness? As a final part of 
our survey we confronted the respondents with two more elaborate ethical dilemmas designed 
to really test their most basic ethical intuitions in this area. In a first dilemma, respondents 
were asked to assume that company X is involved in business activities that they find ethically 
unacceptable but that an ethical fund has come in contact with a group of its shareholders 
which want to make the company change its ways. By investing a large sum of money in 
company X, the ethical fund would be able to give these more progressive shareholders a 
majority of the votes at the company’s annual general meeting. So “what do you think that the 
ethical fund should do?”, we asked.  
  In a second dilemma, respondents were once again asked to assume that 
company X is involved in activities that they find ethically unacceptable, but now they are 
told that most stock analysts predict that company X’s shares will be one of the winners on 
the stock market this year. An ethical fund decides to invest in company X and donate the 
returns to charity – is this ethically correct? These dilemmas were constructed to force 
respondents to choose between the avoidance strategy and shareholder activism, and the 
avoidance strategy and philanthropy, respectively – where it is assumed that the moral purity 
perspective would favour the avoidance strategy whereas the moral effectiveness perspective 
would favour shareholder activism and philanthropy (inspiration was taken from discussions 
of similar dilemmas in Irvine 1987 and Sandberg 2008). 
  Tables 8 and 9 indicate the results for the two dilemmas. As Table 8 shows, 
interestingly, many respondents seem to have found it rather difficult to choose between the 
avoidance strategy and shareholder activism. While a slightly higher number of respondents 
opted for shareholder activism compared to those who opted for the avoidance strategy, most 
respondents (39.0%) chose to characterise the dilemma along the lines of what philosophers 
call a genuine ethical dilemma – that is, as a situation where all alternative actions are 
ethically prohibited. This result seems to suggest that respondents really struggled when 
trying to decide between the moral effectiveness perspective (which in this case seems to 
recommend shareholder activism) and the moral purity perspective (which here seems to 
recommend the avoidance strategy). Our results in this area are roughly in line with those of 
Lewis and Mackenzie (2000b), who presented their respondents with two similar, although 
less detailed, dilemmas between avoidance and activism. 
 
---------------------------------------------- 
    




  Curiously, as Table 9 shows, respondents seem to have found the choice 
between the avoidance strategy and philanthropy a bit easier. Only 3.9% were here in favour 
of philanthropy whereas a majority (55.9%) were in favour of the avoidance strategy. Still, a 
good number of respondents (39.7%) either couldn’t answer or acknowledged that they had 
conflicting intuitions. It should be noted that the available choice options here were 
formulated in a slightly stronger language than in the previous dilemma, which may have put 
some respondents off from, e.g., siding wholeheartedly with the ethical fund’s particular 
flavour of philanthropy. Also, as we found above, respondents hold philanthropy as a largely 
ineffective investment strategy (much more ineffective, for instance, than shareholder 
activism) – and so it might have been more unclear to them whether siding with philanthropy 









4. Further statistical analysis: A conflict within or between respondents? 
 
To summarise our preliminary analysis above, we have found that respondents – at least in 
general and taken as a group – show considerable support for both the moral purity 
perspective and the moral effectiveness perspective. And furthermore, they seem to find it 
difficult to choose between these perspectives. These are indeed interesting results, but before 
we try to understand them there are a few further things that we need to analyse more exactly. 
We believe that the obvious follow-up question to our results above is whether individual 
respondents themselves really have conflicting intuitions about ethics in investment, or 
whether the quite general figures above actually hide subgroups of respondents with 
somewhat different moral outlooks – that is, whether the clash of intuitions is not really just a 
clash between different groups of respondents. Lewis and Mackenzie (2000b) report that, 
although most of their respondents showed great support for the current practices of ethical 
funds (mainly the avoidance strategy and traditional shareholder activism), they found 
evidence of a “consistent minority” supporting more confrontational forms of ethical 
investment (p. 215).
3 
  Judging from the contemporary philosophical discussion pertaining to the ethics 
of investing we would expect someone who only, and wholeheartedly, supported the moral 
purity perspective to (1) definitely say that there are certain companies which they think that 
ethical funds ought to avoid, (2) hold that ethical funds never ought to invest in any of these 
companies, (3) say that investing indirectly in these companies is just as wrong as investing 
directly in them, (4) submit primarily non-consequentialist reasons for why funds ought to 
avoid these companies, (5) have no strong views on whether funds should try to make the 
                                                 
3 It should be noted, however, that this consistency really only is a consistency between people’s answers to two 
rather similar ethical dilemmas; both choices between the avoidance strategy and confrontational shareholder 
activism (p. 221).    
world a better place, and (6) say that the ethical funds in our two dilemmas ought to stick to 
the avoidance strategy. On the other side, we would expect someone who wholeheartedly 
supported the moral effectiveness perspective to (1) be less likely to say that there are certain 
companies which ethical funds ought to avoid investing in, (2) say that it varies from case to 
case to what extent an ethical fund ought to avoid these companies, (3) be less sure about 
whether investing indirectly in them is morally problematic, (4) submit primarily 
consequentialist reasons for why funds ought to avoid these companies, (5) have very strong 
views on whether ethical funds should try to make the world a better place, and (6) choose 
activism and philanthropy over the avoidance strategy in our two dilemmas. 
  In order to see if respondents actually think systematically along the lines of the 
effectiveness and purity perspectives we performed a number of chi2 tests. As a starting point 
for the analysis we used their answers to the first of our dilemmas; that is, the choice between 
the avoidance strategy and shareholder activism.
4 This dilemma is roughly in line with the 
kind of question that Lewis and Mackenzie (2000b, p. 221) used to identify their “consistent 
minority”. Furthermore, as previously noted, the philosophical literature suggests that the 
dilemma represents a clear choice between the two perspectives (we assume that the moral 
purity perspective here would favour the avoidance strategy whereas the moral effectiveness 
perspective would favour shareholder activism). It may also be noted that our formulation of 
the relevant choice alternatives allowed respondents to indicate whether they were unsure of 
which strategy they preferred. Taken together, then, these considerations indicate that the 
respondents who chose one of the two main strategies in our first dilemma are the ones most 
likely to represent hardline purity and effectiveness supporters.  
  To see if these respondents’ reasoning in connection with our first dilemma was 
systematic across dimensions (1) to (6) above, Chi2 tests were performed against the other 
items in the questionnaire connected to these dimensions. Now, to the extent that they really 
are thinking systematically along the lines of the two perspectives, what one would expect is 
statistically significant relationships for most or all of them. However as can be seen in Table 








  The two statistically significant relationships are in the bottom part of the table. 
First of all, we found a fair degree of internal consistency between the respondents’ answers 
to our two dilemmas – that is, people who chose avoidance over shareholder activism in 
Dilemma 1 (and therefore were included in the moral purity group) were indeed more likely 
to choose avoidance over philanthropy in Dilemma 2 (χ
2 (2) = 10.57, p < .05). (However as 
noted above, very few really chose the philanthropy alternative in this second dilemma and so 
there was unexpected attraction to the avoidance option also in the moral effectiveness 
group.) Secondly, the respondents who were included in the moral purity group also indicated 
weaker support for the idea that ethical funds ought to try to make the world a better place 
(Question 5), which we generally associate with the effectiveness perspective (χ
2 (4) = 10.12, 
p < .05). (Interestingly, however, a majority of the moral purists still think that the goal of 
influencing companies is sufficiently important to warrant a sacrifice of at least some 
                                                 
4 We also tried other baselines for our analysis, such as Question 2 and Dilemma 2, which gave somewhat 
alternative but in general less statistically significant results.    
resources, and they are indeed slightly overrepresented in the group which said that all 
resources should be dedicated to this.) 
  These results may be taken to lend some further credence to our choice of 
Dilemma 1 as the baseline for delimiting the two groups. Carved up in this way, namely, we 
have found at least some consistency in respondents’ views in line with what the 
philosophical literature suggests. But are our respondents really thinking systematically along 
the purity and effectiveness perspectives understood exactly as philosophers understand 
them?  
  In the end, our most interesting result probably is the lack of statistically 
significant relationships for the other four items. As shown in the top part of Table 10, a first 
indication of that investors are not thinking systematically comes up when running a crosstab 
analysis against Question 1. Judging from the philosophical literature, we would expect that 
members of the moral purity group should show greater support for ethical funds’ use of the 
avoidance strategy than members of the moral effectiveness group. But as noted in the 
previous section almost all of the respondents in our survey displayed strong support for the 
avoidance strategy. Hence, our analysis failed to discover any statistically significant 
difference between the two groups (χ
2 (1) = 0.03, p > .05). 
  Similar results are given by a crosstab analysis against Question 3. We would 
associate the idea that investing indirectly in unethical companies is morally problematic 
primarily with the moral purity perspective, which is the absolutist or deontological way of 
justifying the avoidance strategy (as opposed to the idea that avoidance may influence 
companies to change their unethical ways, which seems less likely in cases of indirect 
investment). Once again, however, almost all of the respondents in our survey displayed 
strong support for the idea of indirect moral contamination and we found no statistically 
significant difference between the two groups (χ
2 (2) = 0.66, p > .05). 
  These indications are given further and more worrisome support by an analysis 
of how members of the two groups generally justify their support for avoidance (Question 4). 
The reader may remember that respondents were invited to choose from a whole range of 
alternative reasons, ranging from the clearly deontological to the clearly consequentialist, to 
indicate why they thought that ethical funds should avoid investing in certain companies (if 
they indeed thought that they should do so). As shown in Table 10, however, we found no 
statistically significant differences between the two groups in relation to any of the reasons 
provided. What this means is that members of our moral effectiveness group were not less 
likely to hold, for instance, that it is wrong in itself to profit from unethical activities (χ
2 (1) = 
0.74, p > .05) or that it is wrong to have any connection whatsoever to such activities (χ
2 (1) = 
0.09, p > .05). In a similar fashion, members of the moral purity group were not less likely to 
recommend avoidance because of its potential to influence companies (χ
2 (1) = 0.02, p > .05) 
– quite to the contrary, this was actually the most popular reason supplied by the moral 
purists! 
  The most flagrant indication of that our respondents did not hold systematic 
purity or effectiveness opinions, however, is shown by our analysis of their responses to 
Question 2. When asked to what extent ethical funds ought to avoid investing in morally 
problematic companies, we would expect members of the moral purity group to be more 
likely to support the highest threshold (0% acceptance) whereas the moral effectiveness camp 
may say that it varies from case to case. Once again, however, our analysis failed to find any 
statistically significant difference between the two groups’ responses (χ
2 (3) = 1.42, p > .05).
5 
Interestingly, a majority (52%) of the members of the moral effectiveness group actually 
advocated a 0% threshold. Now this is not only contrary to our hypothesis but actually an 
                                                 
5 This analysis was also performed with the two middle alternatives deleted, with a similar non-significant result.     
example of logically contradictory ethical beliefs. What makes these respondents into 
members of the moral effectiveness group, remember, is that they chose shareholder activism 
over avoidance in Dilemma 1. One the one hand, then, they are saying that ethical funds never 
ought to invest in unethical companies (advocating a 0% threshold), whereas they on the other 
hand are ready to accept that the ethical fund in Dilemma 1 actually ought to invest in the 
unethical company! 
  All in all, we should perhaps say that the statistical analysis showed differing 
results. Sometimes the way in which respondents answered suggests that they had consistent 
moral orientations that elicited similar responses to different items. But more often, however, 
the answer to one question was actually in conflict with the answer on another question. This 
latter fact is even more surprising considering that the analysis focused on the respondents 
deemed most likely to represent hardline purity and effectiveness supporters in the first place 
(remember that respondents that indicated that they were unsure about Dilemma 1 were 
excluded from the analysis)! We conclude from this that there overall is little statistical 
ground for thinking that something like a consistent moral purity group or a consistent moral 
effectiveness group really exists among our respondents. 
  
 
5. Discussion: Explaining respondents’ conflicting intuitions 
 
Our more in-depth statistical analysis above indicates that the seemingly conflicting results of 
section 3 cannot simply be thought of as a conflict between different groups of respondents 
with different moral outlooks, but many individual respondents actually seem to be struggling 
with conflicting ethical intuitions themselves. But what does this mean more exactly, and how 
can it be explained? As already noted, Mackenzie and Lewis (1999) found that 
overshadowing the ethical beliefs of the ethical investors they interviewed was “a fog of 
confusion”. More specifically, they report that their interview subjects “had not adopted a 
rigorous or well-thought-out ethical approach” (p. 450), and suggest that one reason for this 
may be that they wanted to be able to get away with combining their ethical beliefs with 
conventional financial investment strategies. All of Mackenzie and Lewis’ interview subjects 
reported that they really only invest a fraction of their capital in funds with an ethical profile, 
and they were also less keen on sacrificing financial returns for ethical pay-off than our 
respondents were. Thus, “[t]he problem ethical investors face”, Mackenzie and Lewis write, 
“is that while they have ethical concerns they are not prepared to sacrifice their essential 
financial requirements to meet these concerns. So they have to find a compromise“ (ibid.). 
  The compromise, then, is actively or unwittingly refraining from thinking more 
systematically about ethics. In the end, Mackenzie and Lewis interpret their subjects as 
essentially being in favour of what they call a “portfolio approach” to ethics: “A portfolio 
approach to ethics spreads money across a range of investments with varying ethics/return 
profiles. You might for example have a small amount of money in a highly ethical fund with 
poor expectations of financial return, a larger amount of money in a somewhat ethical fund 
with better expectations of return, and the rest in a range of other investments with a spread of 
risks and returns.” (ibid.). The main reason for why their subjects hadn’t developed a well-
thought-out ethical approach, Mackenzie and Lewis suggest, was then to be able to have an 
easy conscience while applying this approach to ethics. “[I]t is possible that more rigorous 
ethical analysis may undermine the validity of the portfolio approach to ethics and so make 
ethical investment rather less palatable to conventional financial strategies” (p. 451). 
  While Mackenzie and Lewis fail to report by which standards they found their 
interview subjects to have poorly thought-out ethical approaches, we believe we have 
provided evidence to validate this description by comparing our respondents’ views with the    
contemporary philosophical literature pertaining to the ethics of investing. Thus, we agree 
with Mackenzie and Lewis that ethical investors’ ethical beliefs are far from systematic and 
well-thought-out. But we are not particularly convinced by their explanation of why this is so. 
We indeed found that most of our respondents also held only a fraction of their investments 
(median was in the 11-20% interval while the mode was in the 1-10% interval) in ethical 
funds. Furthermore, another couple of Chi2 tests confirmed that they seemingly did not let the 
details of their ethical beliefs influence what proportion of their investments they held in 
ethical funds; this factor actually failed to have a statistically significant relationship with any 
of our items. But even so, we simply see no good reasons for thinking that they had actively 
or unwittingly chosen their ethical beliefs to be able to get away with this. In fact, most of our 
main results are in direct conflict with Mackenzie and Lewis’ model of ulterior financial 
motives and easy consciences. 
  It should be noted once again that our respondents’ ethical beliefs actually are 
rather radical and demanding in many regards – indeed far more demanding than the 
contemporary ‘ethical’ practices of ethical funds. For instance, a majority of our respondents 
(56.5%) answered that the genuinely ethical thing to do would be to never invest in certain 
unethical companies, and as many as 71.9% thought that you are morally tainted by your 
relation to these companies even if you invest only indirectly in them. Furthermore, a clear 
majority (65.0%) of our respondents thought that the aim of influencing companies to change 
is sufficiently important to warrant at least some sacrifice of financial returns. Now it simply 
seems hard to believe that our respondents chose these ethical beliefs, either actively or 
unwittingly, in order to be able to have an easy conscience while applying conventional 
financial investment strategies. Such non-ethical investing is clearly also unethical according 
to their own lights. Whereas we found that our respondents had conflicting ethical beliefs, 
then, it certainly does not seem like they had compromised on any of these beliefs as such. 
And, obviously, this is partly why they become conflicting in the first place – taken as a 
group, our respondents come out as both hardline moral purists and quite progressive 
proponents of moral effectiveness! 
  So is any alternative explanation of this phenomenon possible? Well, we suggest 
that a key to understanding the ethical beliefs of ethical investors can be found in the 
contemporary psychological literature on intuitions in ethics, and this is indeed why we have 
been framing our analysis in terms of ethical intuitions throughout the paper. An intuition in 
ethics can be defined as a spontaneous and pre-theoretical ethical judgement which arises in 
an individual when confronted with either an abstract question about ethical principles or, 
more commonly, a concrete ethical dilemma or scenario (Sandberg and Juth 2010, Tersman 
2008). According to some recent studies from both psychologists and neuroscientists, there 
are clear indications that much of our ethical thinking really is determined by this sort of 
intuitive ethical judgements that we make (for recent overviews of this work, see Haidt and 
Kesebir 2010, Sinnott-Armstrong 2008). Now psychologists disagree about the exact origin of 
our ethical intuitions – some say, for instance, that they are the product of evolution while 
others emphasise their social or cultural connotations (cf. Haidt 2001, Sinnott-Armstrong 
2008). Furthermore, philosophers disagree about whether these recent psychological findings 
should be taken to undermine the reliability of our ethical intuitions, i.e. whether they still can 
be appealed to in sound moral reasoning (cf. Sandberg and Juth 2010, Singer 2005, Tersman 
2008). A fairly popular stance on philosophical methodology, however, suggests that the role 
of the philosopher basically is to systematise our ethical intuitions – i.e., to make them as 
coherent and therefore reliable as possible – by trying to find ethical principles which can 
explain them. On this view, the philosopher would go back and forth between intuitions and 
principles, sometimes revising his principles but sometimes also discarding his intuitions,    
until he reaches what is called a reflective equilibrium between principles and intuitions 
(Rawls 1971, Sandberg and Juth 2010). 
  Our suggestion here is basically that both the moral purity and moral 
effectiveness perspectives pertaining to ethics in investment have close affinities to very 
widespread ethical intuitions – intuitions forming part of what philosophers tend to call 
‘common sense morality’ (see, e.g., Kagan 1989). A very general kind of evidence for this is 
that roughly similar lines of thinking are central parts of the ethical discussions pertaining to 
many other fields – discussions in, e.g., biomedical ethics, consumer ethics, and 
environmental ethics – and, furthermore, that the two perspectives really represent two 
general ways of theorising about ethics (deontology versus consequentialism) between which 
the main debate in more theoretical moral philosophy could be said to stand (cf. Kagan 1998). 
More specifically, it may be noted that several recent psychological studies have been able to 
confirm the existence of both deontological and consequentialist modules in the human 
psyche which seem able to explain somewhat different parts of our moral reasoning (see, e.g., 
Baron and Ritov 2009, Ditto and Liu 2010, Tanner et al. 2008) – and there is indeed a debate 
among moral psychologists as to whether the two different sorts of intuitions may stem from 
radically different kinds of psychological processes (cf. Greene 2010).  
  When our respondent ethical investors respond to our ethical queries, then, we 
suggest that they can be understood as essentially relating a very basic set of ethical intuitions 
which they share with many others. Interestingly, when asked questions pertaining mainly to 
the avoidance strategy, our respondents tended to come out as hardline moral purists, and 
when asked questions pertaining mainly to the other ethical investment strategies, they tended 
to think more in terms of the moral effectiveness perspective. Moreover, they obviously had a 
hard time responding to questions which specifically asked them to try to weigh different 
ethical considerations against each other. Our explanation of these results is simply that they 
did not have any more well-thought-out moral outlook, as already established, over and above 
their set of basic ethical intuitions. Lacking a more well-thought-out moral outlook, or a moral 
theory, they were simply altogether swayed by their more basic ethical intuitions – and they 
were seemingly able to follow through on these intuitions (even to the extent of defending 
quite radical ethical judgements) when considering different strategies separately, but were 
really at a loss when put in situations where more than one kind of intuitive response was 
possible. 
  It may be noted that Mackenzie and Lewis’ model paints a fairly pessimistic 
picture of the moral psychology of ethical investors. On our view, however, we suggest that 
there really is nothing different or worrisome about these investors’ moral psychology. The 
fact that they give contradictory answers to our ethical questions only goes to show that they 
have conflicting ethical intuitions but, according to the philosophical and psychological 
literature we have been referring to, probably all of us have (cf. Kagan 1998, Sinnott-
Armstrong 2008). And the fact that they do not have any more well-thought-out moral 
outlook only goes to show that they are not philosophers. But, obviously, not everyone can be 





The present paper has related the results of an exploratory survey distributed among 
individuals invested in so-called ethical funds, and attempted to develop a better 
understanding of these individuals’ ethical beliefs – especially concerning whether, or why, 
they think that the practices of contemporary ethical funds indeed are ethical. Survey 
questions were informed by the contemporary philosophical literature pertaining to the ethics    
of investing and designed to elicit the respondents’ basic intuitions about the ethics of 
different investment strategies. Our results indicate that respondents show considerable 
support for both a moral purity perspective and a moral effectiveness perspective, and they 
seem to find it difficult to choose between these perspectives. Indeed, we find that this is not 
just a conflict between different groups of investors with different moral outlooks, but many 
individuals themselves seem to be struggling with conflicting ethical intuitions. We have 
argued that these results are incompatible with the idea that ethical investors refrain from 
thinking systematically about ethics simply in order to be able to get away with also investing 
in non-ethical funds. A more probable explanation is that respondents simply report on central 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Q# Question  wording  Alternatives 
No, they should not avoid investment in any businesses/industries 
Yes, they should avoid companies that pollute the environment 
Yes, they should avoid companies that use child labor 
Yes, They should avoid companies that produce tobacco, alcohol, or firearms 
Q1  Do you think that ethical funds 
should avoid investing in 
companies that you perceive to 
be ethically problematic? 
(several options possible)  Yes: other alternative (open question) 
A. An ethical fund ought never to invest in any of these companies 
B. It may be acceptable to invest in companies that get less than 5% of their 
turnover from these products/practices, but no more 
C. It may be acceptable to invest in companies that get less than 10% of their 
turnover from these products/practices, but no more 
Q2  To what extent ought an ethical 
fund to avoid investing in 
ethically problematic 
companies? 
D. It varies from case to case to what extent an ethical fund ought to avoid 
investing in these companies 
A. It is just as wrong for an ethical fund to invest in company Y as it is to 
invest in company X 
B. It is worse to invest in company X directly than to invest in company Y, but 
both alternatives are bad 
C. It is wrong to invest in company X but unproblematic to invest in company 
Y 
D. It is worse to invest in company Y than to invest in company X, but both 
alternatives are bad 
Q3  Assume that company X is 
involved in practices you find 
ethically unacceptable and that 
company Y is a company 
holding shares in company X. 
Which of the following 
statements do you agree with 
the most? 
 
E. None of the above/Don’t know 
A. I think it’s wrong to profit from these companies’ activities 
B. I think it’s important to demonstrate your disapproval of these companies’ 
activities 
C. I think it’s wrong to give financial support to these companies, which is 
what you do when you invest in them 
D. I believe you can influence companies by refraining from investing in them 
E. I think it’s wrong to have any connection whatsoever to these companies’ 
activities 
Q4  The reason why I think that an 
ethical fund should avoid 
investing in the companies 
above is: (several options 
possible) 
F. Other reasons 
A. No, an ethical fund ought not to be engaged in influencing companies at all. 
B. Yes, an ethical fund ought to try to influence companies as best as it can. But 
without sacrificing any financial return 
C. Yes, an ethical fund ought to dedicate some resources to influencing 
companies, investors will have to accept somewhat lower returns 
D. Yes, an ethical fund ought to dedicate considerable resources to influencing 
companies, investors will have to accept much lower returns 
Q5  Do you think that ethical funds 
ought to try to make the world a 
better place, for instance by 
influencing companies to take a 
stronger social responsibility? If 
so, to what extent ought they to 
be dedicated to this? 
 
E. Yes, an ethical fund ought to dedicate all of its resources to influencing 
companies, this is much more important than returns 
To avoid investing in companies which fail to comply with certain ethical 
criteria 
To vote at the annual general meetings of “unethical” companies 
To conduct an active dialogue with “unethical” companies 
To expose “unethical” companies in the media 
To invest directly in companies with an ethical or environmental profile 
To be an active owner in both “ethical” and “unethical” companies 
Q6  Below are a number of 
strategies which an ethical fund 
could use to influence 
companies into becoming more 
socially responsible. How 
effective do you think that these 
strategies are? (alternatives on a 
5-point Likert scale) 




  Ethical dilemmas 
D1  Assume that company X is involved in something you find ethically unacceptable, but that an ethical 
fund has come in contact with some of company X’s shareholders who are committed to change in this 
area. By becoming a major shareholder in company X, i.e. through buying a large amount of shares in 
the unethical company, the ethical fund can now give the progressive shareholders a majority of votes 
at the company’s annual general meeting. What do you think that the ethical fund ought to do? 
    
A.  The ethical fund ought to buy the shares in the unethical company X and try to change the company 
from within. 
B.  It would be wrong of the ethical fund to buy shares in the unethical company X. The other shareholders 
will have to try to change it on their own. 
C.  Regardless of how the ethical fund acts its behaviour is ethically problematic – it is wrong to buy that 
many shares in an unethical company, but also wrong not to try to influence its activities 
D.  None of the above/Don’t know 
D2  Assume that company X is involved in something you find ethically unacceptable, but that most stock 
analysts believe that company X’s shares will be among the year’s winners on the stock market. An 
ethical fund decides to invest in company X and donate the money to charity – and, sure enough, the 
fund makes a ton of money which it then donates to needy children. What do you think about the fund’s 
behaviour? 
 
A.  The ethical fund acted altogether correctly 
B.  I would rather have seen that the ethical fund acted differently, but under these circumstances it was 
okay 
C.  The ethical fund acted altogether wrongly 




Q2: To what extent ought an ethical fund to avoid investing in ethically problematic 
companies? 
 
A. An ethical fund ought never to invest in any of these companies  56.5% 
B. It may be acceptable to invest in companies that get less than 5% of their turnover from these 
products/practices, but no more 
12.4% 
C. It may be acceptable to invest in companies that get less than 10% of their turnover from these 
products/practices, but no more 
3.1% 
















Q3: Assume that company X is involved in practices you find ethically unacceptable and that 
company Y is a company holding shares in company X. Which of the following statements do 
you agree with the most? 
 
A. It is just as wrong for an ethical fund to invest in company Y as it is to invest in company X  36.8%    
B. It is worse to invest in company X directly than to invest in company Y, but both alternatives 
are bad 
35.1% 
C. It is wrong to invest in company X but unproblematic to invest in company Y  1.9% 
D. It is worse to invest in company Y than to invest in company X, but both alternatives are bad  4.5% 




Q4: The reason for why I think that an ethical fund should avoid investing in the companies 
above is: 
A. I think it’s wrong to profit from these companies’ activities 
 
50.1% 
B. I think it’s important to demonstrate your disapproval of these companies’ activities  67.6% 
C. I think it’s wrong to give financial support to these companies, which is what you do when 
you invest in them 
62.3% 
D. I believe you can influence companies by refraining from investing in them  61.2% 
E. I think it’s wrong to have any connection whatsoever to these companies’ activities  40.2% 






Q5: Do you think that ethical funds ought to try to make the world a better place, for 
instance by influencing companies to take a stronger social responsibility? If so, to what 
extent ought they to be dedicated to this? 
 
A. No, an ethical fund ought not to be engaged in influencing companies at all. 9.5% 
B. Yes, an ethical fund ought to try to influence companies as best as it can. But without 
sacrificing any financial return 
25.2% 
C. Yes, an ethical fund ought to dedicate some resources to influencing companies, investors will 
have to accept somewhat lower returns 
46.5% 
D. Yes, an ethical fund ought to dedicate considerable resources to influencing companies, 
investors will have to accept much lower returns 
11.5% 
E. Yes, an ethical fund ought to dedicate all of its resources to influencing companies, this is 









Q6: Below are a number of strategies which an ethical fund could use to influence 
companies into becoming more socially responsible. How effective do you think that these 
strategies are? 
    
To avoid investing in companies which fail to comply with certain ethical criteria  3.47 
To vote at the annual general meetings of “unethical” companies  2.83 
To conduct an active dialogue with “unethical” companies  3.15 
To expose “unethical” companies in the media  3.61 
To invest directly in companies with an ethical or environmental profile  3.89 
To be an active owner in both “ethical” and “unethical” companies  2.63 




Dilemma 1: Assume that company X is involved in something you find ethically 
unacceptable, but that an ethical fund has come in contact with some of company X’s 
shareholders who are committed to change in this area. By becoming a major shareholder in 
company X, i.e. through buying a large amount of shares in the unethical company, the 
ethical fund can now give the progressive shareholders a majority of votes at the company’s 
annual general meeting. What do you think that the ethical fund ought to do? 
 
A. The ethical fund ought to buy the shares in the unethical company X and try to change the 
company from within. 
19.1% 
B. It would be wrong of the ethical fund to buy shares in the unethical company X. The other 
shareholders will have to try to change it on their own. 
16.6% 
C. Regardless of how the ethical fund acts its behaviour is ethically problematic – it is wrong to 
buy that many shares in an unethical company, but also wrong not to try to influence its activities 
39.0% 





Dilemma 2: Assume that company X is involved in something you find ethically 
unacceptable, but that most stock analysts believe that company X’s shares will be among 
the year’s winners on the stock market. An ethical fund decides to invest in company X and 
donate the money to charity – and, sure enough, the fund makes a ton of money which it then 
donates to needy children. What do you think about the fund’s behaviour? 
 
A. The ethical fund acted altogether correctly  3.9% 
B. I would rather have seen that the ethical fund acted differently, but under these circumstances 
it was okay 
24.3% 
C. The ethical fund acted altogether wrongly  55.9% 




















No 4  5  Support for avoidance 
strategy in ethical funds (Q1)  Yes (to any option)  96  95 
.86 121 
0% threshold  52  62 
5% 20  13 
10% 6  6 
View on appropriate 
avoidance degree (Q2)  
Varies from case to case  22  19 
.70 118 
It is just as wrong to invest in Y 
as in X 
55 62  .72  104 
It is worse to invest in X than in 
Y, but both alternatives are bad 
39 34     
Support for indirect moral 
contamination (Q3) † 
It is wrong to invest in X but 
unproblematic to invest in Y 
6 4     
























Reason for avoidance (Q4) †† 
 
 







No 2  16 
Yes, without sacrificing return  27  27 
Yes, some resources  55  41 
Yes, considerable resources  10  9 
Importance of attempting to 
influence companies (Q5) 
Yes, all of its resources  6  7 
.038  126 
The ethical fund acted 
altogether correctly 
9 7 
I would rather have seen that it 
acted differently, but under 
these circumstances it was okay 
42 16 
Support for choosing 
philanthropy over avoidance 
(D2) ††† 
The ethical fund acted 
altogether wrongly 
49 77 
.005  123 
Bold: Significant difference between groups at P < .05 
*: defined as the population that answered "The fund ought to buy the shares in the unethical company" to Dilemma 1 
**: defined as the population that answered "It would be wrong of the ethical fund to buy shares in the unethical company" to Dilemma 1 
†: The "Don't know" alternative was removed for this analysis, as was the alternative "It is worse to invest in company Y than to invest in 
company X, but both alternatives are bad" since it was deemed irrelevant as an indicator of respondents’ preferences along the 
purity/effectiveness dimension.  
††: For each alternative, only the percentage that indicated support is presented in the table. One Chi2 test per alternative was performed. 
†††: The “Don't know” alternative was removed for this analysis. 
 
 